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INTRODUCTION 
 
International consumer boycotts will never end child labor. No crystal ball is needed to make 
that clear. A boycott by rich country consumers of all the products and services made or 
produced by children would only affect a tiny percentage of the total numbers of child 
laborers. Of the 246 million child laborers around the world1, only a small percent works in 
the export sector.2 An even more comprehensive boycott, linked to child-helping plans, and 
carried out by consumers and employers in all countries, rich and poor, is simply impossible 
to imagine. Considering the likely unexpected consequences, such a broad-based boycott 
would be undesirable. 
 
And yet, a credible argument exits for limited boycotts: A boycott against goods made by 
children, or services rendered by children, might support or strengthen other efforts to 
eliminate exploitative child labor. 
 
Boycotts take negative or positive forms. Negative boycotts are instructions not to buy (e.g. 
not to buy a class of products, or specific products made by specific producers). Positive 
boycotts seek to persuade consumers to buy (e.g. class of products or specific products not 
made by children). The latter include “social labeling” campaigns, which exhort consumers 
to purchase products designated with a label indicating that they have not been made by 
laboring children. 
 
Success for either kind of boycott should be measured in two ways. One is a change in a 
manufacturer’s or service provider’s behavior that benefits – or at least does not harm 
                                            
1 “Facts on Child Labour,” ILO, Geneva, March 2003. 
2 The vast majority works in agriculture, and for the most part, not in export agriculture. “Facts on 
Child Labour in Agriculture,” Fact Sheet, International Labour Office, March 2003, downloaded 
October 20, 2003, from www.ilo.org. 
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– child workers generally. The other measure of success should be the well-being of children 
who are working before the boycott is launched. A truly successful boycott would benefit –
or at least not harm – those children. 
 
1. THE THEORETICAL CASE 
 
Suppose that children are working at jobs that are harmful, hazardous or morally 
objectionable. Many efforts are underway to help the children by protecting them from 
immediate harm, and provide for their safety and welfare in the long-term. As part of those 
efforts, the children and people working with the children realize that some employers are 
refusing to release from employment the most harmed or at-risk children. Or, some 
employers are refusing to make the work or workplace safer than it is at present. To bring 
pressure on that employer, the children and their supporters call upon customers to stop 
purchasing products until the employer gives in to their demands. 
 
In practice, child labor-related boycotts launched in the United States and Europe in the 
1980s and 1990s produced results that are, by the measures of success spelled out above, 
mixed. Two boycott campaigns – against child-made soccer balls, and against the purchase 
of child-made carpets – will be considered. 
 
A reasonable, although still conditional, case can be made for boycott threats that do not 
advance to the full boycott stage. Two boycott threats will be discussed. 
 
2. FOUR BOYCOTTS AND BOYCOTT THREATS IN THE 1980’S AND 
1990’S 
 
All of the cases considered have been extensively described elsewhere, and so only 
summaries are offered here. 
 
Handmade Carpets: In the late 1980s, European non-governmental organizations launched a 
boycott of handmade, Oriental-style carpets from India.3 The organizations called the 
boycott in response to reports that children making the carpets were being overworked, 
underfed, physically mistreated, and kept in conditions of bonded labor. 
 
The boycott was eventually called off.4 Reasons why included unintended consequences: 
 
                                            
3 Much of the factual basis for this account has been derived from “By the Sweat and Toil of Children, 
Volume IV: Consumer Labels and Child Labor,” U.S. Department of Labor. Washington, DC, 1997, 
pp. 15-60. 
4 No firm dates are available at this writing for when the boycott was started or called off. 
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— Children making carpets in India had been fired, but given no other assistance to help 
them survive or contribute to their families’ welfare. The boycott was making the lives of 
some child workers worse than when they had been working. 
 
— The boycott had a great impact on one country (India) where carpets were being made by 
children but not in others (Pakistan, Nepal, Morocco) where children also were working. 
 
— Boycotters could not differentiate between manufacturers who employed and exploited 
children and manufacturers who did not. 
 
— The boycott tainted handmade rugs generally, although some countries (e.g. Iran) have 
virtually eliminated child labor. 
 
Subsequently, at least four “social labeling” efforts were launched. Two involved putting 
labels on the backs of rugs purportedly not made by children, and two involved displaying 
labels at retail locations claimed to collect money from participating companies in the 
export-import chain and use the money to establish schools and health clinics for children in 
rug-making areas.5 
 
The label schemes have gotten quite a bit of exposure in the news media, and that has helped 
spread word about the poor working conditions experienced by children working in India’s 
carpet industry. A change in the way carpets are marketed in Europe has boosted prospects 
for the social labeling schemes. Small, family-run carpet stores have been losing sales to big, 
supermarket-style stores carrying lower prices (and often lower quality) carpets. These stores 
had centralized purchasing departments, and have demonstrated both a concern about child 
labor and an aversion to the stigma that a boycott could have put on their brand names. 
These large stores have begun to stock some carpets carrying the new social labels. 
Participation in “social labeling” by small retailers is spotty. 
 
Soccer Balls: As early as 1995, human rights workers reported that Pakistani children were 
making soccer balls in the town of Sialkot, a medium-sized town where the vast majority of 
the world’s tournament-quality soccer balls were being produced.6 6An international 
consumer boycott against child-made balls spread to the United States in 1996. The boycott 
sought to embarrass the companies that sponsored the World Cup soccer tournament. The 
companies, such as Adidas and Nike, had brand names whose value largely rests on 
consumer opinions. The boycotters hoped that the big companies would then pressure their 
suppliers – companies whose brand names are virtually unknown – to stop employing 
children. The campaign also called for the International Federation of Football Associations 
(FIFA) to require that producers making products carrying FIFA’s stamp of approval agree 
not to employ child laborers. The campaign also sought to ensure that the “no child labor” 
labels be verifiable. 
                                            
5 The first two are named Rugmark and Kaleen. The second two are Care & Fair and STEP. All are 
described in USDOL, 1997, and Janet Hilowitz, “Labelling child labour products: A preliminary 
study,” International Labour Office, Geneva, 1997. 
6 This is a capsule version of a longer story, which is well told in USDOL, 1997, pp. 95-126. 
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The boycott did not have any known effect in sales of brand-name soccer balls, but it did 
generate many stories in the news media. In 1997, the brand-name companies agreed with 
their Pakistani suppliers on a plan to take children out of the soccer ball industry, and 
improve local schools.7 Many soccer balls now carry a no child labor label. 
 
Child labor, however, has not disappeared from the soccer ball industry in Pakistan and 
India.8 As recently as the 2002 World Cup tournaments, further efforts have been made to 
embarrass the brand-name companies into taking more action against child labor.9 
 
Boycott Threat I: A Threatened National Boycott: Beginning in 1987, several versions of 
legislation were introduced into the U.S. Congress that proposed banning imports of goods 
made by children younger than age 15. In effect, the bill proposed a national boycott of 
child-made goods. The 1992 version of the bill10 is commonly known as the Harkin bill.11 
Notably, the bill did not single out any one country’s products.12 
 
Manufacturers in one country, however, reacted strongly: Bangladeshi garment 
manufacturers, who had employed an estimated 100,000 children, protested that if the bill 
were to pass, they and their nation’s economy would be ruined. At that time, Bangladesh was 
selling more than half its garment exports to the United States. In the spring of 1995, the 
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) announced that it 
would address the child labor issue by firing child workers.13 
 
                                            
7 The plan was supported by; the International Labor Organization; Save the Children; UNICEF; and 
the Sialkot, Pakistan Chamber of Commerce. 
8 David Rowan, “Child labour is used to make 'World Cup' balls,” The Times (London), May 22, 
2002. 
9 World Cup Campaign 2002,, http://www.globalmarch.org/world-cup-campaign/press.php3, accessed 
October 20, 2003. 
10 Beginning in 1987, early versions of the proposed national boycott against child-made imported 
goods did not gain as much public attention as did the 1993 Harkin bill. And so, to clear up confusions 
about timing, the following sequence is noted: Harkin introduced a version of the national boycott in 
August 1992. He reintroduced the bill in 1993. Harkin’s office issued a new press release on March 
18, 1993, which did not mention the 1992 version of the bill. 
11 To become U.S. law, legislation must be passed both houses of the U.S. Congress – the Senate, and 
the House of Representatives – and signed by the president. To be considered by either house of the 
U.S. Congress, Each piece of legislation must have sponsors in both the House and the Senate. Each 
bill has an official number and title, but they often – as in this case – acquire shorter nicknames. Tom 
Harkin was, and is, a Democrat from Iowa. 
12 A 1994 study of child-made products imported to the United States found that such products were 
being imported from at least 19 countries. See “By the Sweat and Toil of Children: The Use of Child 
Labor in American Imports,” U.S. Dept. of Labor, July 15, 1994. 
13 Staff Correspondent, “BGMEA decides total elimination of child labour by Oct. 31,” The Daily 
Star, May 18, 1995. 
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Some fired children found other work, in more miserable conditions than they had 
experienced in the garment factories.14 The children’s new plight caused a stir in 
Bangladesh, and a variety of accusations were floated against Harkin and the bill’s 
supporters. Although the Harkin bill was not withdrawn, a series of events ensued that 
resulted in a 1995 memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), Unicef and the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association (BGMEA). The MOU established a set of programs removing the remaining 
children from the garment industry and placing them in schools. 
 
Boycott Threat II: Negotiating Ploy: During the MOU negotiations, the Bangladeshi garment 
manufacturers refused to continue negotiating. A U.S. coalition of organizations opposed to 
child labor threatened to call for a consumer boycott of Bangladeshi garments. The coalition 
had not been part of the negotiations. But the coalition had been following negotiations 
closely, and threatened the boycott as a tactic to persuade garment manufacturers to return to 
the bargaining table. When the garment manufacturers did return, and when the MOU was 
signed, the coalition called off the boycott.15 
 
3. ANALYSIS: 
 
Both full-fledged boycotts succeeded in some respects. Each boycott successfully mobilized 
attention by appealing to the morality and consciences of rich-country consumers. Both case 
aspersions on large companies that, by contrast, seemed unsympathetic. The two boycotts 
and the Harkin bill received wide press attention; the boycott threat during negotiations over 
the Harkin bill began getting press attention before the boycott threat was withdrawn. 
 
During both boycotts, and the Harkin bill reaction in Bangladesh, manufacturers, 
distributors, marketers and others were forced to take notice of the child labor issue. Both 
boycotts also got wide attention in the public news media. This is in part because the 
boycotts offered a compelling contrast between the lives of consumers in the United States 
and Europe, and the lives of the child makers of carpets and soccer balls. Balls and carpets 
are associated with play, comfort even luxury. By contrast, the lives of children making these 
consumer products were notably lacking in play and comfort. 
 
If nothing else, then, the boycotts helped raise awareness about child labor. At a time when 
many interventions against child labor were being devised at the international, national and 
local levels, the widespread media attention to the boycotts probably helped build public 
support in rich countries for their country’s assistance to international anti- child labor work. 
 
Three out of the four cases examined, however, had unanticipated and unwanted effects. In 
the carpet case, these effects led to the end of the negative boycott, and the beginning of 
                                            
14 The exact number of children fired, and subsequently employed in other occupations, has never 
been determined. S.L. Bachman, ''If we were fired from the factory, I could go to school, but then who 
would feed my mother and sister?'' San Jose Mercury News, July 17, 1995. 
15 “MOU on child labour appreciated in U.S.,” The New Nation, July 8, 1995. 
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social labeling campaigns. In the soccer ball case, despite the agreement among brand name 
companies and less well-known manufacturers to remove children from the industry, recent 
reports say that children continue to make soccer balls. 
 
Only the strategic boycott threat made during MOU negotiations in Bangladesh had an effect 
that, in retrospect, still appears wholly beneficial: the garment industry’s return to the 
bargaining table, and the conclusion of the MOU. And yet, the link between the boycott and 
the decision of garment manufacturers to negotiate the MOU has not been definitively 
proven. Definitive proof will not be available until someone from the Bangladesh garment 
industry says, in so many words, that the threatened boycott led the industry back to the 
bargaining table. 
 
Outcomes from each of the boycotts varied in part because of each boycott’s scope. Broad-
based boycotts, in the garment and Harkin bill cases, generated complaints that 
manufacturers who were not employing children were being punished at the same time as 
manufacturers who were employing, and exploiting, children. The soccer ball boycott 
involved a smaller number of known brand-name companies, which could be embarrassed 
by revelations of the conditions in which their products were made. (The soccer ball 
marketers and manufacturers, in addition, had a case study to examine: how the bad publicity 
heaped on the Bangladesh garment industry when it initially fired children in response to the 
Harkin bill’s boycott threat. That example suggested that firing children, and resisting some 
kinds of MOU-type agreement, would tarnish the upbeat image they had cultivated.) 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS & UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
 
The limited case for boycotts rests on the hope that boycotts can mobilize attention among 
parties reluctant to take action to benefit children. In the very short term, a boycott threat 
may help galvanize action by a boycotted party The second Bangladesh boycott threat 
suggests that this occurred in 1995, but does not prove it. Despite a great deal of 
disagreement about the Harkin bill’s effects on Bangladesh’s garment industry, over the 
eight years since the MOU went into effect, child labor has been minimized in Bangladesh’s 
garment industry. Whether the children not directly benefited by the MOU benefited in the 
long run is not yet known.16 Whether child labor has diminished in Bangladesh as a whole, 
or even among the families whose children had been working in the industry, it remains too 
early to say. Social marketing campaigns (positive boycotts) show some promise. But few 
comprehensive evaluations of their effects have been completed.17 
 
 
Significant questions remain. They include: Is a boycott or the threat of a boycott worth 
initiating if, from the outset, it is known that the results will be mixed? What if it is possible 
                                            
16 16 Unicef and the International Labor Office are currently evaluating the MOU’s effects on the 
approximately 100,000 children who had been working in the industry before 1995. At most, 8,000 
children benefited from the MOU. 
17 17 Hilowitz, 1997. 
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to know that more children will be harmed in the short term than helped, but long-term 
benefits might be great and widespread? Could any international consumer boycott help the 
vast majority of child laborers, who do not produce goods or services for the international 
consumer market How can the resulting boycott avoid punishing employers or workplaces 
that do not exploit children at the same time that it punishes workplaces and employers that 
do? How long will the public have patience for any boycott? If working children, who are 
being harmed by their work, do not support a boycott, should the boycott be initiated 
anyway? 
 
The case for boycotts and for boycott threats, then, remains tentative and conditional. This 
discussion has only dealt with four cases, and has only touched upon positive boycotts. 
Many more cases should be analyzed. 
 
Knowing more about how to initiate a boycott without causing unintended harm would be 
useful as the attention of the U.S. government and international agencies shifts to different 
categories of child labor. Even though the vast majority of children does not work in export 
industries, children still can be found in appalling circumstances that lend themselves to the 
kind of attention-getting news media coverage that helped highlight children in carpet, 
garment, and soccer ball manufacturing. Recent reports about exploited, and often trafficked, 
children picking cocoa beans in West Africa led to calls from activist groups to boycott 
“slave chocolate.”18 Many stories have described sex tours during which adults have sex 
with children.19 Without such media attention, mobilizing public support for international 
efforts against child labor might be difficult. (Whether local activists will benefit from 
international attention will vary from case to case.) 
 
It doesn’t take a crystal ball to see that some export sectors are ripe for such attention. The 
international sex tourism industry is one. Nor does it take a crystal ball to see that boycotts, 
or threatened boycotts, are among the actions that anti-child labor groups might launch to 
protest egregious cases of child exploitation. What remains hazy is how boycotts or boycott 
threats might be used in a way that produces a net benefit for children, without causing the 
kinds of unintended harm caused by earlier boycotts launched in opposition to child labor. 
 
                                            
18 18 For instance, “Initiative to Combat Child Slave Labor in Cocoa Fields Hailed,” Jim Lobe, One 
World, July 4, 2002, Global Exchange, www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/ fairtrade/cocoa/271.html 
m accessed /October 20, 2003. 
19 See, for instance, links on Andrew Vachss’ The Zero site, 
http://www.vachss.com/help_text/sex_tourism.html. 
